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Soifer: Rule of Law or Awful Lore?

REMEMBRANCE, GROUP GRIPES, AND LEGAL FRICTIONS:
RULE OF LAW OR AWFUL LORE?
Aviam Soifer*
“History corrects for the scale of heroics that we would otherwise
project upon the past. Only myth tells us who we would become; only
history can tell us how hard it will really be to become that.”1
ABSTRACT
The rise of groups that honor and seek to advance their particular imagined or real pasts has seemed increasingly dangerous in the
years since Bob Cover’s death in 1986. This essay briefly examines
the challenges such groups pose to Bob’s hope, and even his faith, that
law and legal procedure could be bridges to more just worlds. It may
not be ours to finish consideration of how to distinguish the Rule of
Law from Awful Lore—both composed of exactly the same letters—
but we should continue that task, with remembrance, even within our
troubled world.
*

B.A., Yale College 1969; M. Urban Studies, Yale City Planning, and J.D., Yale
Law School, 1972. Avi was dean and professor at the William S. Richardson School
of Law, University of Hawai’i (2003-2020), where he continues to teach and write,
primarily about constitutional law and legal history.
He expresses great gratitude to the Shabbos group members of ancient days, and to
the current staff members and faculty of the Touro Law School. He also extends his
thanks to the other Conference presenters and attendees, and to the entire Touro Law
Review staff—with special appreciation to Samantha Karpman, Chris Palmieri, and
Ariel Berkowitz, as well as to his research assistant, Jake Honigman. As always,
Marlene Booth, Martha Minow, Carol Weisbrod, and Steve Wizner provided wonderful conversations as well as great help —enlivened by their own loving memories
of Bob Cover. Eloquent remarks by Diane and Avidon Cover made the Conference
particularly memorable, and--characteristically--Sam Levine was a wonderful,
knowledgeable host, and an inspiration.
1
Robert M. Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U.L. REV.
179, 190 (1985).

2011

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2022

1

Touro Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 4 [2022], Art. 14

2012
I.

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 37

ORIGINS

It is wonderful that we still gather to remember Robert Cover’s
work and to honor Bob more than thirty-five years after his sudden
death. Someone born the year we lost Bob is old enough to run for
President2—and it is about time. Yet, this conference itself
underscores how fresh and provocative remembrance of Bob still is for
those of us gathered for it, and for countless others who have become
Bob’s students since we lost him in 1986. We share awareness of the
enormity of his grievous loss for the world of challenging ideas and
genuine inspiration.
My theme in this brief essay is remembrance, and what a
vital—and at times dangerous— concept remembrance turns out to be.
Specifically, much of what we have learned about remembrance in the
years since Bob died contains sobering lessons. It also underscores the
importance of Bob’s interest in history, myth, and complicity. Since
Bob’s death, we have learned considerably more about how intricately
intertwined these three concepts can be. If only we could question,
and undoubtedly argue, with Bob about our current troubled reality!
Bob brilliantly taught many of us about the jurisgenerative
qualities of community, and also about the jurispathic power of law.
Poetry, Bob argued, proves no match for the iron fist of legal force,
even when the state’s legal fist is wrapped in velvet.3 The pen is not,
in fact, mightier than the sword. In virtually any contest for judicial
action, state force will win, even within the terms of a judge’s
explanation. At times, as Bob emphasized, this may require a heavy
dose of cognitive dissonance as a judge who feels conflicted about the
justice of a law nonetheless insists on following it, often claiming that
there is no other choice.4
In the time since Bob died, we have developed a greater—and
more sobering—understanding of how greatly groups themselves may
be dangerous, even as they become what might be termed
jurisretrospective. Sadly, we now better understand that the past—
imagined or real—may easily be used to justify even the unjustifiable,
2

U.S. CONST. art. II § 1, cl. 5.
Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L. J. 1601,1606, 1609-10, 161516 (1986) [hereinafter Violence and the Word]; see also Robert M. Cover, The Bonds
of Constitutional Interpretation: Of the Word, the Deed, and the Role, 20 GA. L. REV.
815, 815-17 (1986) [hereinafter The Bonds of Constitutional Interpretation].
4
ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 195-267 (1975).
3
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including horrific violence and overt challenges to the rule of law. To
an extent, Bob’s hard-nosed and far-reaching analysis of law included
a soft spot for groups and for the norms generated by communities.5
Throughout the bloody years since Bob’s brilliant work was cut short,
we could have used his assistance in refining his relative embrace of
groups.6 Society seems to be experiencing an overload of what Bob
termed “committed action”7 ; the puzzle is how to distinguish the kind
of group resistance Bob celebrated from dangerous variations on this
theme. Unfortunately, we cannot rely on the “committed actors” themselves. Too often, we have seen that committed contrarians tend to
believe that their particular group is engaged in a sacred mission. The
entire world has witnessed great danger from such groups, and some
who stormed the Capitol on January 6, 2021 only constitute a familiar,
recent example.8 Bob claimed that it is “committed action that distinguishes law from literature,”9 but we now seem to be encountering too
much committed group action that disregards the law entirely.
Groups—many of whom define themselves through their
shared specific gripes against government, general society, and other
groups—are vital to the lives we actually live.10 But they have long
been, and are still, substantially “undertheorized” in mainstream Anglo-American law.11 The frictions that groups create in law tend to be
papered over, if not entirely ignored. Though the very legal existence
5

He celebrated a “cohesive community,” the kind “already self-conscious and lawful
by its own lights.” ROBERT M. COVER, NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE
ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 151 (Martha Minow et al. eds., Univ. Mich. Press 1995)
[hereinafter NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW]. It was only such a group that
could make “[t]he persistent effort to live a law other than that of the state’s officials.” Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 50 n.137 (1983)
[hereinafter Nomos and Narrative].
6
See infra Section IV.
7
Nomos and Narrative, supra note 5, at 49.
8
Capitol Riot: One Year Later, AP NEWS, https://apnews.com/hub/capitol-siege (last
visited Feb. 27, 2022).
9
Nomos and Narrative, supra note 5, at 49.
10
See, e.g., KAI ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS (1966); MAX WEBER, THE
PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (1905); EMILE DURKHEIM, THE
RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD (1895).
11
I wrote a book about the importance of the diverse groups in which we live and
their place in American legal history and constitutional law. At best, I may have
wrestled the concept “freedom of association” to a draw. AVIAM SOIFER, LAW AND
THE COMPANY WE KEEP (1995). See also CAROL WEISBROD, THE BOUNDARIES OF
UTOPIA (1980); John V. White, Nomos and Nation: On Nation in an Age of “Populism,” 37 TOURO L. REV. 2035 (2022).
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of many groups remains anchored in Anglo-American legal fictions,
in reality some groups have become increasingly powerful and threatening, at even an existential level. Meanwhile, we have hardly begun
to grasp the parameters of the legal rights of dissenters within groups.12
In addition, we know that governmental officials heavily rely on informants from within groups, but the recruitment and handling of these
informants remains largely subterranean.
What would Bob say? Our lived experience has, if anything,
deepened the paradox within Bob’s description of himself as an
anarchist who loves law. It has added pressure, but also emphasis, on
Bob’s belief that law may be the only bridge between “the ‘world-thatis’ . . . [and] ‘worlds-that-might-be,’”13 between our troubling reality
and our shared longing for a better future. Indeed, law “is the bridge—
the committed social behavior which constitutes the way a group of
people will attempt to get from here to there.”14 Yet even in wrestling
with the traditions of the Jews—and Bob happily, deeply and viscerally identified with the Jewish people—he never came to rest. He
delved knowledgeably and creatively into Jewish thought, though he
did not get to produce the American Talmud he had proposed at age
sixteen.15 And he remained fascinated by internal Jewish dissenters.
These included, for example, the rabbis in Safed who sought to restore
the rabbinic line in 1535.16 Bob also often talked about how the Babylonian Talmud dealt with Rebellious Elders, though I never got to
read or hear his views about the relatively few examples of Jewish excommunication, which are discussed briefly in Section IV.17
Bob’s love for, and illumination of, complexities triggered by
opposition to mainstream authority provokes a core question: Why did
Bob choose to become an expert on jurisdiction, and to do pioneering
12

Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARV. L.
REV. 990, 993 (1930). See generally CAROL WEISBROD, EMBLEMS OF PLURALISM:
CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND THE STATE (2002).
13
Cover, supra note 1, at 181; Nomos and Narrative, supra note 5, at 9.
14
Cover, supra note 1, at 181 (emphasis added).
15
See generally Stephen Wizner, The Life and Work of Robert Cover, 37 TOURO L.
REV. 1739 (2022); Joseph Lukinsky, Law in Education: A Reminiscence with Some
Footnotes in Robert Cover’s Nomos and Narrative, 96 YALE L.J. 1836 (1987).
16
Robert Cover, Bringing the Messiah Through Law: A Case Study, in RONALD
PENNOCK & JOHN W. CHAPMAN, RELIGION, MORALITY, AND THE LAW: NOMOS
XXX 201 (N.Y.U. Press 1988); see also Aviam Soifer, Preface, in NARRATIVE,
VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at vii, x, xii.
17
See infra Section IV.
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work about civil procedure and how and why it matters?18 There is a
clue in the fact that he insisted, as learned and innovative a theoretical
thinker as Bob assuredly was, that his office be located wthin the Yale
Law School Clinic. He then would be available to offer practical legal
help on procedural intricacies in real cases, while enjoying the zesty
tumult of everyday lawyering. Yet, Bob also boldly challenged assumptions about jurisdiction and the other elements of procedure that
constitute the grammar of the law. For instance, he wrote: “We construct meaning in our normative world by using the irony of jurisdiction, the comedy of manners that is malum prohibitum, the surreal epistemology of due process.”19 This cryptic sentence reveals much—not
least Bob’s abiding commitment to recognizing incongruity and humor, even in unexpected realms.
More than most law professors—and certainly more than most
lawyers and judges—Bob recognized that there are high stakes in the
irony of the rules and their exceptions within the permeable barrier
lawyers call “jurisdiction.” By placing malum prohibitum within the
“comedy of manners” that we construct, Bob suggested that even when
law distinguishes between right and wrong, it is crucial to remember
that the malleable categories of what is legal and what is illegal are our
own creations, along with the pathways and barriers we then use to
distinguish between them. In praising Professor James William
Moore, for example, Bob emphasized that procedure demands consistency; he also maintained, however, that shibboleths such as jurisdiction ought not be utilized to block the core concerns expressed in
Rule 1 of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: “[The Rules] shall

18

Wizner, supra note 15; Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy:
Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981) [hereinafter
The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy] (celebrating “complex concurrency” in federal and state jurisdiction as a “daring system”); Robert M. Cover, For James W.
Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718 (1975) [hereinafter For James W. Moore] (contrasting trans-substantive procedure and substantive procedure). Bob claimed that the only way a state’s jurispathic act is not revealed as naked force “is through the judge’s elaboration of the institutional privilege
of force—that is, jurisdiction.” NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW, supra note
5, at 156. See generally ROBERT M. COVER ET AL., PROCEDURE (1988); ROBERT M.
COVER & OWEN M. FISS, THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE (1979). For a brief, keen
comparison of the procedural history of adjudication with alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, see Judith Resnik, For Owen Fiss: Some Reflections on the Triumph and Death of Adjudication, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 173 (2003).
19
Nomos and Narrative, supra note 5, at 8-9.
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be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action.”20
Bob emphasized the central irony that we make law, but that
we also treat law itself as reified.21 This helps explain his emphasis on
the salience of narrative over law, of aggadah over halachah.22 To
Bob, law exists to fill the gap between our sometimes silly-seeming
rules and the potential tragedy in the clash between good and evil.23
Yet, Bob recognized that “[w]hen the devil is our own creation, he becomes comic.”24
The origin of Anglo-American common law is often said to be
so long ago, so shrouded by the mists of time, that it remains “a time
to which the mind of man runneth not to the contrary[.]”25 Nonetheless, we recognize that we build Anglo-American law through
precedent— the accumulated work product of fallible human beings.
Our law may be created, or at least partially justified, through a theoretical rule of recognition26 or a grundnorm27; it may be valued as if
through a veil of ignorance28 or as an unfinished work of fiction.29 Yet
20

FED R. CIV. P. 1; For James W. Moore, supra note 19, at 739-40.
See generally Aviam Soifer, Covered Bridges, 17 YALE J. L. & HUM. 55 (2005).
22
To oversimplify enormously, aggadah is the traditional term for nonlegal interpretation of Jewish sources, whereas halachah is the traditional term for Jewish law.
There has been considerable learned criticism of Bob’s use of Jewish law. For some
of the best, see Susanne Last Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text: The Turn to the
Jewish Legal Model in Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REV.
813, 876-893 (1993); Samuel J. Levine, Halacha and Aggada: Translating Robert
Cover’s Nomos and Narrative, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 465, 470-73, 485-87 (1998);
Nomi M. Stolzenberg, Uncovering the Tradition of Jewish “Dissimilation”: Frankfurter, Bickel, and Cover on Judicial Review, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 809, 853-55
(1998).
23
Soifer, supra note 22, at 61-62.
24
Nomos and Narrative, supra note 5, at 8 n.24.
25
THOMAS HODGKIN, THE DEATH OF ROME: THE OSTROGOTHIC INVASION–ITALY
AND HER INVADERS BOOK III 228 (2d ed., 1889). See also Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr., The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 (1897) (discussing competing property claims in a hypothetical dispute about the legal doctrine of prescription, described an older, inactive claim as traceable “further back than the first recorded history[,]” yet reflecting “the deepest instincts of man.”). Though Holmes famously
shunned references to justice in the work of judges, however, in this instance he favored an active entrepreneur’s claim over the older claim, and he did so “in justice.”
Id.
26
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 97-102 (1961).
27
HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 115-123 (1949).
28
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY oF JUSTICE 136-141 (1971).
29
See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
21
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wise legal historians, such as Bob Cover undoubtedly was, continue to
demonstrate that we need deep skepticism both when we consider law
in the past and as we continue to make law today. For example, the
next chapter in Ronald Dworkin’s serial novel might be supplied by a
new group in power who assert—perhaps in the spirit of the
fashionable anti-novels of the 1980s—that the entire Dworkinesque
ouevre that preceding their ascension was but a dream.30 In other
words, while in theory there may be no difference between theory and
practice, in practice there is.
So is there, in fact, no real rule of law?
II.

RULE OF LAW: AWFUL LORE?

As a law school dean, I experienced more than a few boring
administrative meetings outside our law school campus. While quietly
trying to stay awake by doing anagrams, I discovered that rearranging
the letters of “Rule of Law” can yield “Awful Lore.” Even garbed in
full jurispathic armor, the former unquestionably can become the latter. This may be so even when law is fully articulated, procedurally
proper, and widely applied. Various totalitarian regimes with vastly
different ideologies have demonstrated, and sadly still demonstrate,
that both the law on the books and the law in action can be used to
torture countless victims and kill poets—even if not fully able to destroy all that is poetic.31 Tragically, there is much history behind Grant
Gilmore’s famous conclusion: “The values of an unjust society will
reflect themselves in an unjust law. The worse the society, the more
law there will be. In Hell there will be nothing but law, and due process
will be meticulously observed.”32
30

See generally THEODORE HERZL, IF YOU WILL IT, IT IS NOT A DREAM (1997) (I do
not mean to lean heavily on the famous saying by Theodore Herzl, regarded as the
founder of modern Zionism that “If you will it, it is not a dream.”). Curiously, in an
earlier review that Dworkin wrote of Cover’s JUSTICE ACCUSED, he stressed the due
process violation within the federal Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, which paid officials
twice as much for returning slaves than they would be paid if they allowed Blacks to
go free. Ronald Dworkin, The Law of the Slave-Catchers, TIMES LITERARY
SUPPLEMENT, Dec. 5, 1975, at 1437, 1437 (reviewing ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE
ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975)).
31
Bob once said he went to law school to make the world safe for poetry. Martha
Minow, Introduction: Robert Cover and Law, Judging, and Violence, in NARRATIVE,
VIOLENCE AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 6 n.16.
32
GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 99 (2d ed., Yale Univ. Press
2014).
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If anything, the twentieth century painfully demonstrated that
indeed law can be readily invoked to devastate a vast array of
dissenters; it can pulverize idealism along with communities that nurture and try to preserve poetry, ideals, and mutuality.33 Bob, by carefully studying what judges did—or refused to do—within the slavery
context, produced extraordinary, pathbreaking work about judicial responses to what he termed “the moral-formal dilemma.” He examined
the conflicted role of judges in the context of slavery by beginning his
discussion of antislavery judges, who nevertheless returned fugitive
slaves to slavery, with a quote from Albert Camus’s The Fall: “He who
clings to a law does not fear the judgment that reinstates him in an
order he believes in. But the keenest of human torments is to be judged
without a law.”34
In fact, even-handed procedure is often invoked as a vital aspect of justice. In 1989, for example, Professors Randall Kennedy and
Martha Minow—who each clerked for Justice Thurgood Marshall at
the U.S. Supreme Court—wrote a wonderful essay together about Justice Marshall that emphasized what a stickler for procedure he turned
out to be. This was so even in cases in which the person ousted by a
procedural flaw otherwise had a legal claim with which Marshall could
be expected to empathize. Kennedy and Minow noted:
Respect for procedural rules affords an historically excluded group the chance to demand equality in its most
basic form: “You must treat us as you treat anyone else
who obeys your rules when speaking in self-defense or
self-righteous complaint. Otherwise, we can call your
differential treatment what it isprejudice, not discretion;
injustice, not duly executed authority. And when you,
the official, try to deny us a chance to be heard, you
must also openly admit that your rules do not apply to
us.”35
They explained that “[p]ut perhaps too simplistically, the ideal of the
Rule of Law demands that the players be given a chance to choose to
33

Bob emphasized the importance of “stable cultural understanding,” and he claimed
that the jurisgenesis he celebrated was “a process that takes place in communities
that already have an identity.” Nomos and Narrative, supra note 5, at 50.
34
COVER, supra note 4, at 195.
35
Randall Kennedy & Martha Minow, Thurgood Marshall and Procedural Law:
Lawyer’s Lawyer, Judge’s Judge, 6 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 95, 99 (1989).
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obey the rules and to learn to play within them. In this basic sense, the
Rule of Law calls for fair play.”36 It is important also to recognize that
Justice Marshall was a terrific lawyer as well as a courageous and innovative social justice wayfinder who maintained his belief in the Rule
of Law. A number of Marshall’s former law clerks similarly expressed
their initial surprise as they reminisced about encountering examples
of his emphasis on procedure, such as observing a very sympathetic
plaintiff who was barred for narrowly missing a statute of limitations
deadline.37
But what might we make of exceptions to the general rule that
judges resolve the moral-formal dilemma by choosing the formal path?
What of those judges who follow their own moral path—who might
even stretch the law to serve justice?
Two intriguing, somewhat opposed, examples within the
American legal system complicate the issue of what it means to be the
kind of Cover-esque judge who decides to “cheat” in the non-pejorative sense Bob suggested.38 The first is that of a Vermont Judge, Theophilus Harrington, who had a fugitive slave case before him in 1804.39

36

Id. at 99-100.
See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, What Thurgood Marshall Taught Me, N.Y. TIMES
MAG. (July 15, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/14/magazine/thurgoodmarshall-stories.html; Second Circuit Celebration of Thurgood Marshall’s Legacy,
C-SPAN (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.c-span.org/video/?419830-2/justice-thurgood-marshalls-legacy&playEvent.
38
COVER, supra note 4, at 197 (“By formal principles I mean: (1) those governing
the role of the judge, his place vis-à-vis other lawmaking bodies, his subordination
to precedent, statute, Constitution; (2) the hierarchical character of the judicial system and the respect due to both the decrees and the precedents of higher tribunals
and especially the Supreme Court; (3) the standards of professional responsibility,
articulated more often in schools, treatises, and controversial literature than in decisions and statutes; (4) the sense of the judicial craft.”).
39
How Harrington came to be a judge is a complex story in itself. His predecessor,
Stephen Jacob, bought a slave in New Hampshire and brought her to Vermont in
1783. He won his case claiming that the Town of Windsor was responsible for her
care once she was old and feeble. This is because Vermont had formally abolished
slavery in 1777 though a constitutional provision found in Article 1, Section 1 which
gave Vermont pride of place years before becoming the fourteenth state in 1791. VT.
CONST. art. 1, § 1. Section 1 also provided that someone still could voluntarily become “a servant, slave or apprentice.” Selectmen of Windsor v. Jacob, 2 Tyl. 192,
194 (Vt. 1802). This proved a pyrrhic victory for Judge Jacob. With wonderful
irony, his house—the most imposing in Windsor—later became one of the bestknown stops on the Underground Railroad. See Aviam Soifer, De Facto Slavery and
37
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Known as “the barefoot judge,” because he was known to preside without shoes on occasion, Judge Harrington fully understood that, though
he was a state judge, he had taken an oath to uphold the federal Constitution. Therefore, he said that he was obliged to return a fugitive
slave to slavery.40 He only needed to be certain of the title to this
“property.” Presented with evidence that both the slave and the slave’s
mother had been held in slavery, Harrington responded that he still
needed to see “a bill of sale from God Almighty,” and, lacking that, he
freed the slave.41
The other example involves the renowned Chief Justice
Lemuel Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and Betty,
a slave in Tennessee who was brought to Massachusetts by her mistress and her husband.42 Shaw was the leading judge to develop the
law that involved slavery in Massachusetts, which had national repercussions.43 Over several decades he had held that a slave brought into
Massachusetts voluntarily by an owner was automatically free. On the
other hand, a mob of free blacks had rescued a fugitive slave named
Shadrach directly from Shaw’s courtroom, even as Shaw personally
tried to block the door.44 Thereafter, many people believed that the
entire Commonwealth had been humiliated because Chief Justice
Shaw had to bow under the chains that ringed his courthouse before he
ordered the return to slavery of a fugitive slave named Anthony
Burns.45 With this background, as well as a chaotic scene around
Shaw’s courthouse as people with radically different views sought to
the “Syren Songs of Liberty and Equality”: Carol Weisbrod, Much Obliged, 40
CONN. L. REV. 1315, 1321 (2008).
40
Aviam Soifer, Constrained Choices: New England Slavery Decisions in the Antebellum Era, in FREEDOM’S CONDITIONS IN THE U.S.-CANADIAN BORDERLANDS IN
THE AGE OF EMANCIPATION (Tony Freyer & Lyndsay Campbell eds., 2011).
41
Soifer, supra note 40, at 1325 (referencing WILBUR H. SEIBERT, VERMONT’S ANTISLAVERY AND UNDERGROUND RAILROAD RECORD 5 (1937)).
42
Aviam Soifer, Status, Contract, and Promises Unkept, 96 YALE L.J. 1916, 192129 (1987).
43
LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW
(1967).
44
Soifer, supra note 43, at 1919 n.43.
45
LEVY, supra note 44, at 72-108. See also STANLEY CAMPBELL, THE SLAVE
CATCHERS: ENFORCEMENT OF THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW, 1850-1860 149 (1970);
CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, RICHARD HENRY DANA, A BIOGRAPHY 182-83 (rev. ed.
1891) (The rescuers “went off toward Cambridge, like a black squall, the crowd driving along with them and cheering as they went.”); Leonard W. Levy, Sims’ Case:
The Fugitive Slave Law in Boston in 1851, 35 J. NEGRO HIST. 39 (1950).
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talk with and influence Betty, Shaw used an unusually personal narrative voice to explain his brief interview with Betty and the decision
that followed.46 Shaw declared that it would be a denial of Betty’s
freedom—under Shaw’s earlier decisions for his Court, Betty clearly
was free once voluntarily brought by her owners into Massachusetts—
to reject Betty’s choice to return to Tennessee, and to her children and
husband.47
Shaw’s opinion made sure to summarize the conflict of law
provisions of the era—even in slave states. At least formally, standard
conflict-of-law analysis provided that once free, a slave who returned
to a slave state nonetheless remained free to change her mind and
thereby to be free again. But, he also quietly defied the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford.48 Handed down earlier that
year, Chief Justice Taney’s opinion clearly denied all Blacks, slave or
free, the kind of jurisdictional attention that Shaw gave to Betty.49
Both Vermont and Massachusetts had some in their legal communities
who were receptive to the seemingly rogue actions—judicial cheating—by Judges Harrington and Shaw. But, what of communities further outside the mainstream? What anchors their core ideas about justice?

46

Betty’s Case, 20 MONTHLY L. REP. 455 (Mass. Nov. 9, 1857). The decision was
not officially reported. I relied on this unofficial report and contemporary newspaper
accounts in an article that contained a detailed discussion of Betty’s Case and related
Coveresque issues. Soifer, supra note 43.
47
Following Chief Justice Shaw’s decision, a spirited debate ensued among antislavery activists, extensively covered in William Lloyd Garrison’s The Liberator, including discussion of missed opportunities such as purchasing Betty’s freedom as well
as whether it really could be said that Betty had a husband and children back in Tennessee under the law of slavery. I learned many years later that Betty soon appeared
to change her mind, that she met her husband in Cincinnati, and that they were free.
As the Liberator reported, with considerable sarcasm, Betty “suddenly left her mistress whom she loved so much, took passage upon the under-ground railroad, and
safely escaped to Cincinnati, where she was joined by her husband, who is a free
man.” EDLIE L. WONG, NEITHER FUGITIVE NOR FREE: ATLANTIC SLAVERY,
FREEDOM SUITS, AND THE LEGAL CULTURE OF TRAVEL 102 (2009) (quoting William
Lloyd Garrison, The Slave Betty, LIBERATOR, Feb. 19, 1858, at 31). There was no
mention of children.
48
60 U.S. 393 (1857).
49
For remarkable research and a cogent discussion of this case and its context, see
LEA VANDERVELDE, MRS. DRED SCOTT (2009); DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED
SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW & POLITICS (1978).
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COMMUNITIES AND THE LAW: ‘“COLLECTIVITY’… IS THE
SMUDGIEST WORD IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE.”50
A.

Legal History

The great English historian, Frederic Maitland, spent a significant part of his career wrestling with groups and the history of legal
fictions. For example, he pointed out that trusts and other legal fictions
created to empower groups proved uniquely able to resist the vigorous
centralizing efforts of Henry VIII.51 Maitland was one of a group of
leading legal scholars from 1880 to 1920 who vigorously debated the
central role of groups. He argued that voluntary arrangements beyond
contract were so important historically that England “knew no formal
severance of Public from Private Law.”52 Moreover, he warned that
once a person began to concentrate on the history of groups, other history might seem “superficial” and a scholar might discover that “much
the most interesting person that you ever knew was persona ficta.”53
The work of Maitland, and other leading English legal historians of his time, generally omits the Jews. That is no surprise, as the
Jews officially were exiled from England in 1290, following massacres, blood libels, and other forms of violence and overt discrimination
against them. Though Jews themselves were not present, ironically,
they did turn up in English legal history discussions before a few Jews
were allowed to return, and long before their legal rights in England
began to be recognized fitfully in the 1800s.54 Therefore, Maitland and
his colleagues did not have to confront two timeless questions about
50

SOIFER, supra note 11, at 73 n.10 (referencing Frederic William Maitland, “Moral
Personality and Legal Personality,” Sidgwick Lecture for 1903, Newnham College,
in FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, SELECTED ESSAYS 235 (H.D. Hazeltine et al.,
eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1936)).
51
See id. at 72-77.
52
Id. at 74 n.15.
53
Id. at 73. Maitland also maintained that “A fiction that we needs must feign is
somewhere or another very like the simple truth.” Id. at 71. For my own argument
about the breadth of legal fictions, see Aviam Soifer, Legal Fictions Reviewed, 20
GA. L. REV. 871 (1986).
54
See Jonathan A. Bush, “You’re Gonna Miss Me When I’m Gone”: Early Modern
Common Law Discourse and the Case of the Jews, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1225, 1280
(1993) [hereinafter You’re Gonna Miss Me]; Jonathan A. Bush, Include Me Out:
Some Lessons of Religious Toleration in Britain, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 881 (1990)
[hereinafter Include Me Out]. See generally CECIL ROTH, A HISTORY OF THE JEWS
IN ENGLAND (2d ed. 1949).
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collectivity. Who is a Jew? And how have the Jews survived? These
puzzles remain unresolved and still animate intense debate. As Ronald
Dworkin noted, associative obligations are “complex, and much less
studied by philosophers than the kinds of personal obligations we incur
through discrete promises and other deliberate acts,” even though associative obligations are, for most of us, “the most consequential obligations of all.”55
In many ways, Bob Cover was a great cross-over artist who
was able to connect profound longstanding questions, such as these,
with others of pressing contemporary concern. For example, he emphasized the centrality of obligations, which are anchored in Jewish
law.56 In Nomos and Narrative, Bob clearly seemed to favor narratives over rules, though he recognized how fundamentally the two
strands are intertwined. Bob loved, and often taught, the work of Franz
Kafka alongside legal history and law. He also appeared to agree with
Mordecai Kaplan, the founder of the Reconstructionist movement,
who liked to say: “The past has a vote, but it does not have a veto.”57
Bob’s last works increasingly reflected his deep immersion in Jewish
sources. For example, in his 1984 John E. Sullivan Lecture at Capital
University, he declared that “each community builds its bridges with
the materials of sacred narrative . . . . The commitments that are the
material of our bridges to the future are learned and expressed through
sacred stories.”58
This pushes one to ponder: “Which are the most meaningful
sacred Jewish stories?” Even if a classic Jewish answer might well be:
“Who wants to know?”
B.

Remembrance

To many, the answer seems obvious. The Torah and Talmud
are the basic sources of sacred Jewish stories. To be sure, Bob hardly
denied the vital importance of these books. Yet, he also recognized
the importance of the group narratives and the possibility that a group’s
55

DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 215.
See Robert Cover, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of The Social Order 5 J.L.
& RELIGION 65 (1987); Nomos and Narrative, supra note 5.
57
Kaplan originally said that “halakha [Jewish law] should have a vote, but not a
veto.” Aviam Soifer, The Spokesman Conundrum: “Is It Good for the Jews?”, 40
L. & SOCIAL INQUIRY 1039, 1044 (2015) (quoting H ASIA D INER , THE JEWS OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1654 TO 2000 200 (U. Cal. Press 2004)).
58
Cover, supra note 1, at 182.
56
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collective understanding might rival—or transcend—the sacred text itself. Moreover, the crucial roles of remembrance and redemption figured prominently in Bob’s work.
Like many of us, Bob was intrigued by the Talmudic story of
the Oven of Akhnai, with its striking endorsement of leaving the interpretation of rules to living human beings—even in defiance of actual
divine intervention.59 In the Talmud, the rejected intervention included supernatural signs and even the voice of God, which sided with
the dissenting rabbi against the prevailing rabbinic majority on a question regarding the laws of kashrut, of what is permissible.60 But the
majority stood firm, with Rabbi Yehoshua stating that “[i]t is not in
heaven,” which many celebrate as the holding of the case.61 There is
even a well-known story that Rabbi Natan later met the Prophet Elijah,
and asked Elijah how God reacted when Rabbi Yehoshua refused to
heed even a heavenly voice. Elijah replied, “God smiled and said, ‘My
sons have defeated me. My sons have defeated me.’”62
The story grows more complicated, however, if one reads just
a little further in the Talmud and learns that the winning majority decided to excommunicate the dissenter, Rabbi Eliezer. Eliezer learned
this when his own student, the legendary Rabbi Akiva, volunteered to
inform him, but could not bear to tell his teacher and instead sat the
requisite distance from Eliezer to let him know. Complicated, destructive, and deadly divine punishments followed, even when vulnerability
had been created by the performance of an apparent mitzvah.63 At the
October conference, I was pleased to learn that Bob’s son, Avidan,
knew and had thought carefully about this wrinkle, though it is considerably less well-known than the much more comforting Oven of Akhnai story.
The Talmud is often portrayed as a dry, rigid set of rules; this
basic misunderstanding has been invoked in anti-Semitic discourse

59

3 THE TALMUD, THE STEINSALTZ EDITION, TRACTATE BAVA METZIA, PART III 59
(A. Steinsaltz ed., Bava Metzia 59A-59B, at 237-240 (1990)).
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 238-40. For particularly insightful recent discussions, see David Luban, The
Coiled Serpent of Argument: Reason, Authority, and Law in a Talmudic Tale, 79
CHI. KENT L. REV. 1253 (2004); Jeffrey Rubenstein, Torah, Shame, and ‘The Oven
of Akhnai’ (Bava Metsia 59a-59b), in TALMUDIC STORIES: NARRATIVE ART,
COMPOSITION, AND CULTURE 34 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1999).
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through the centuries.64 But to read even a little Talmud is to grasp
quickly that its rules are disputed and its arguments readily transcend
time and space. Dissents are recorded and studied across multiple generations. Further, Talmudic study has a participatory, addictive quality.65 It also offers surprising tales that, at times, convey a distinct imaginary quality of the sort associated with “magic realism.”66
One quite “Coveresque” example, because of its emphasis on
chutzpah that is somewhat akin to Bob’s proposed Judicial Cheat, involves none other than the Prophet Elijah.67 This remarkable Talmudic
story about Elijah occurs in a section that discusses informants at great
length. It seems even Elijah became an informant himself, and he was
punished for what he disclosed—which would have allowed a living
person to know how to hasten the coming of the Messiah.68 The angels
in heaven themselves became the informants about what Elijah had
done. It turns out that Elijah spoke at the behest of Yehudah Ha’Nasi
(Yehudah the Prince), one of the greatest rabbis, who is still honored
as the redactor of the entire Mishnah—the core text of the Talmud itself.69
This strange story begins when Yehudah Ha’Nasi had the temerity to ask Elijah, who had been dropping into Yehudah’s yeshiva
from time to time, why he had been coming late. Elijah explained that
he needed to help Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob awaken, wash, dress, and
say their morning prayers. When Rabbi Yehudah asked Elijah why he
did not have the three forefathers pray together, Elijah explained that
he could not do that because to do that would hasten the coming of the
Messiah. Then, Yehudah had chutzpah enough to ask Elijah if there
might be anyone living who would have the ability to accomplish this.
64

Shakespeare’s Shylock quickly comes to mind as an exemplar, yet actors, directors, critics, and scholars have had wildly disparate views about interpreting Shylock.
See generally William SHAKESPEARE, MERCHANT OF VENICE.
65
It might also be said that the men who were praised for studying all day, while the
women worked to support them—as well as to tend to what were often very large
families—were part of an unmistakably long, sexist tradition.
66
Magic realism is primarily a literary genre, introduced largely by Latin American
authors, in which authors and filmmakers insert mythic or fantastical elements into
otherwise matter-of-fact, often realistic narratives.
67
Elijah is not just any prophet. He is said to be the key intermediary between people
on earth and God, and it is Elijah who will lead the Messiah when the Messiah finally
arrives. 4 LOUIS GINSBERG, THE LEGENDS OF THE JEWS 193-235 (1913).
68
5 THE TALMUD, THE STEINSALTZ EDITION, TRACTATE BAVA METZIA, PART V 14546 (A. Steinsaltz ed., Bava Metzia 85B (2000).
69
Id.
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Elijah identified Rabbi Hiyah, a favorite student of Yehudah Ha’Nasi,
as someone so holy that when he and his sons recited the portion of
their regular daily prayer that mentions God’s power to raise the dead,
their very recitation could hasten the arrival of the Messiah. Yehudah
declared a fast day and sent forth Rabbi Hiyah and his sons to lead the
congregation in prayer, and the Talmud relates that “the world trembled in anticipation.”70 However, once the angels “fingered” Elijah as
the informant, Elijah was punished with sixty fiery lashes.71 Elijah
then appeared on earth as a fiery bear and scared away Rabbi Hiyah,
his sons, and his followers—leaving the timing of the Messiah’s arrival
unchanged.
The issue of whether it is desirable or possible to hasten the
coming of the Messiah through words or actions has produced serious
disputation among Jews for millennia.72 Ironically, the Supreme
Court’s controversial schedule for dismantling official school segregation in Brown v. Board of Education II73—“with all deliberate
speed”—echoes elements of this fundamental messianic timing dispute.74
Many Jews revere the Ba’al Shem Tov, who was the founder
of Hasidic Judaism in the1700s.75 Considerable attention is paid to his
statement: “Forgetfulness prolongs the exile; remembrance is the secret of redemption.”76 At Yad Vashem, the Holocaust History Museum
70

Id.
Id.
72
This was a major element in Cover, supra note 1, at 191-97. See also the posthumously published Robert Cover, Bringing the Messiah Through Law: A Case Study,
in PENNOCK & CHAPMAN, supra note 17.
73
349 U.S. 294 (1955).
74
In Brown v. Board of Education II, the Supreme Court’s remedial phase included
an order to federal district courts to take local conditions into account and to “enter
such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary and proper to
admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate
speed.” Id. at 301. As one of many examples of a similarly ambiguous direction,
Isaiah’s famous prophecy about the arrival of the Messiah states: “The smallest shall
become a thousand (a clan), And the least one, a mighty nation. I, the Lord, will
quicken it in its [appointed] time.” Isaiah 60, 22.
75
See, e.g., MURRAY JAY ROSMAN, FOUNDER OF HASIDISM (1996); 10
ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 746 (2d ed. 2006).
76
See, e.g., Editor of Yad Vashem Studies, More Than a Memorial: The Evolution
of Yad Vashem, YAD VASHEM Q. MAG., Fall 2003, at 7.; Rabbi David Golinkin, Tisha
B’Av: Remembrance is the Secret of Redemption, SCHECTER INSTS. INC. (July 13,
2000), https://schechter.edu/tishah-bav-remembrance-is-the-secret-of-redemption.
71

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss4/14

16

Soifer: Rule of Law or Awful Lore?

2022

RULE OF LAW OR AWFUL LORE?

2027

in Jerusalem, these words that are carved at the exit, for all visitors to
pass as they leave. Yet Jews remember in very different ways. As
Yosef Yerushalmi argued in his learned and provocative book, Zakhor:
Jewish History and Jewish Memory, Jews tend to emphasize memory,
rather than history.77 But, which memories should we emphasize, and
what significance should we place on them? A modern translation of
the Hebrew Bible explains that the command zakhor, to remember, “is
not to retain or recall a mental image. It is to focus on the object of
memory that results in action.”78
There is deep irony concerning memory, however, as it is embedded in our Jewish tradition. We repeatedly note in our prayers during Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur, the High Holy Days, that God
remembers everything. Nonetheless, during these holidays we also repeat a central, spirited, and poignant prayer—zachranu l’hayim—a direct plea to God to remember us in granting life.79
The very irony of this pairing increases when the Torah says
that God may need to be reminded of his ancient covenant when he
threatens to destroy the same Israelites he recently liberated from
Egypt. In pleading with God not to carry out this genocidal threat,
Moses resorts to a classic argument: “What would the neighbors
say?”80
For many of us, such prayers and such stories are intertwined
with deeply personal memories that greatly enhance whatever we
might learn through study. Such vivid memories about past Jewish
holidays and those we have lost tend to be vitally important; this kind
of remembrance is in no way inconsistent with the centrality the Ba’al
Shem Tov attributed to remembrance. It is, after all, not only the
77

See generally YOSEF H. YERUSHALMI, ZAKHOR: JEWISH HISTORY AND JEWISH
MEMORY (1982) (contrasting the Jewish emphasis on memory with substantially little attention paid to history).
78
ETZ HAYIM: TORAH AND COMMENTARY 326 (David L. Leiber & Jules Harlow eds.,
2001). In Numbers 14:11, Moses specifically mentions the Egyptians, but he also
points out that the Egyptians will tell other people. Id.
79
MAHZOR LEV SHALEM (Rabbinical Assembly 2010). In this special prayer book
for the Jewish New Year and the Day of Atonement, for example, a full section of
the concluding Musaf prayer on Rosh Hashanah is Zikhronot (Remembrances) at
pages 160-162; similarly, for Yom Kippur, the concluding morning prayer and the
final evening prayer similarly stress remembrance is located on pages 125, 187, 214,
253, 301, 376, and 398.
80
ETZ HAYIM: TORAH AND COMMENTARY, supra note 79, at 846-47. In Numbers
14:13, Moses specifically mentions the Egyptians, but he also points out that the
Egyptians will tell other people. Id.
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Shoah (The Holocaust) and innumerable past horrors that Jews must
remember.81 As we remember Bob Cover, we can join in celebrating
his unique brilliance and his well-read eloquence in seeking a bridge
to a better future. Unlike other forceful leaders, particularly those who
love to argue as Bob surely did, Bob also knew how to listen and how
to do so with care. Yet, even now, it is hard to be as optimistic as was
this sweet, mischievous, wise, warm-hearted, and deeply committed
friend (chaver).82
C.

Sweet Memories

Unquestionably, Bob was a mensch.83 Wonderful memories
flood back as many of us recall Bob Cover as a person. Beyond his
extraordinary writing and teaching, he had a remarkable ability to provoke and inspire; furthermore, he possessed the extremely rare ability
to do all these great things with kindness, an even rarer quality among
distinguished professors. For me and Marlene, many memories are
sweetly personal: attending our regular little shabbos group in New
Haven84 and watching Avidan and Leah growing up under the careful,
81

Elie Wiesel began his 1986 Nobel Peace Prize address with a Hasidic story about
the Baal Shem Tov, and went on to claim that memory and hope are inextricably
intertwined, even within in the context of the Holocaust. “To me,” Wiesel explained,
“hope without memory is like memory without hope.” Elie Wiesel, Nobel Lecture,
Hope, Despair and Memory, NOBEL PRIZE (Dec. 11, 1986), https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1986/wiesel/lecture. Yet, there is also an old Jewish legend that God had to send an angel to make sure that, before babies are born, they
forget all they know—which is why we have indentations just above our upper lips.
See, e.g., Abraham Socher, How the Baby Got Its Philtrum, JEWISH REV. BOOKS
(Summer 2015), https://jewishreviewofbooks.com/articles/1715/how-the-baby-gotits-philtrum. To compound the paradox, those who read the Torah regularly are reminded every year to “blot out the remembrance of Amalek under heaven.” Deuteronomy 25, 17-19. See generally MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND
FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998).
82
One theory regarding the name “Cover” is that it is derived from this Hebrew word
for friend, though there are other theories. The Hebrew word Chaver also often has
been used in left-leaning Jewish circles as the equivalent of “comrade.”
83
A mensch is a person who is unusually upstanding and reliable, but also down-toearth.
84
The shabbos group—we knew that in modern Hebrew it would be the shabbat
group, but the older usage was evocative of our roots. We met on Friday night, generally once a month, with the venue rotating among the participants. The initial theory was that we would enjoy each other’s company over dinner, and then study together. Enjoy we did, but the studying never quite occurred. Instead, we gossiped—
which Justice Holmes once said was different from philosophy only in how one takes
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loving eyes of Diane and Bob—former outstanding Camp Ramah
counselors.85 Later, there were Bob’s visits after a long bike ride from
Newton to our house in Cambridge; a celebratory meeting or two for
ice cream at Cabot’s in Newton; and scattered, laugh-filled reunions
with various shabbos group members.
During the early spring of the year Bob died, he and I greatly
enjoyed knocking around on Georgia’s Sapelo Island, where we were
hosted with incomparable Southern warmth by Milner and June Ball.
We stayed in the old R.J. Reynolds mansion, which had been given to
the state of Georgia and had a distinct “Last Year in Marienbad” feeling of sudden departure and decline.86 Descendants of slaves still lived
on the other half of Sapelo Island, and they sent their children to school
by boat each morning.87 The old Black man running a barbecue joint
had what seemed to be an original Franklin Delano Roosevelt campaign poster inside his shack.
Milner and I walked the beach with Bob for hours, and we
talked—and of course argued—about nineteenth century English novels. Bob insisted there was nothing redeeming about any of them. He
and I also celebrated the Red Sox—Bill James’s books full of innovative baseball statistics showed that James was onto something important, Bob thought, long before the Red Sox hired James as a consultant.88 Finally, the three of us agreed about the particularly sorry
one’s facts. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED WORKS 159 (1920). And we
argued, often against some apparently outrageous position Bob asserted, which he
defended and sometimes expanded as he steadily picked away at one of the two parve
cakes the host always provided. On a few occasions, we literally rolled up the rug
and danced—at least some of us. The group consisted of wonderful characters in
addition to Bob and Diane, Avidan, and Leah; Rachel and Steve Wizner and their
young sons, Jake and Ben; and Marlene Booth and me. The others were: Mike
Churgin, Mary and David Lesser, and Ellen and Jack Shapiro.
85
See Wizner, supra note 15, at 1741.
86
LAST YEAR IN MARIENBAD (Rialto Pictures Mar. 7, 1962).
87
See generally WILLIAM S. MCFEELY, SAPELO’S PEOPLE: A LONG WALK INTO
FREEDOM (1995).
88
Bob did not join the suffering when the ball went through Bill Buckner’s legs in
the 1986 World Series, but he also missed watching as the Red Sox finally “reversed
the curse” in 2004. Bob’s marvelous “Your Law-Baseball Quiz,” which involved
matching famous baseball players and Supreme Court Justices, originally published
in the New York Times, was reprinted in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW, and
is worthy of revival. Editorial, Your Law-Baseball Quiz, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1979,
at 23 (reprinted in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 249-252).
Bob was objective enough to honor a New York Yankee, Yogi Berra, as the proper
match with Earl Warren as “the truly most valuable players” for their teams.
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state of the nation politically and legally in 1986. Eventually, an annual public interest conference emerged from Bob’s notion that, at a
political moment that we naively believed was about as bad as it could
get with the rise of Newt Gingrich and his supporters, lawyers and law
students who sought to do public interest law could help and even inspire one another. Generally organized by students, the Robert Cover
Public Interest Conference has been going on each winter since 1987
(except during the pandemic) and takes place at the snowy Sargent
Camp outside Peterborough, New Hampshire. Fittingly, there is also
a long-running session in Bob’s memory at the annual Association of
American Law Schools (AALS) Conference, during which law professors grapple with pressing intellectual issues. At these conferences,
and elsewhere, there have been wonderful reconnections to and
through our old shabbos group gang.
So is that a community? Is the core group that keeps the annual
Cover Public Interest Conference going year after year a community,
even as the students graduate and move on—many of whom do public
interest work? What of the limiting criteria Bob set forth that “each
community builds its bridges with the materials of sacred narrative . .
. . The commitments that are the material of our bridges to the future
are learned and expressed through sacred stories”?89 Meanwhile, The
Storyteller, a novel by Peruvian author Mario Vargas Llosa, turns customary notions of authenticity and narrative into something of a Jewish
and/or Indigenous pretzel (or perhaps a bowtie kichel).90
The United States Supreme Court has pulverized the notion
that religious beliefs must be tied to sacred texts; moreover, the Court
has even held that they need not be connected to established religions
or to other believers.91 There ought to be, and there is in the United
States, considerable reluctance to allow a government official—or a
jury, for that matter—to inquire as to the sincerity of a person’s

89

Cover, supra note 1, at 182.
MARIO VARGAS LLOSA, THE STORYTELLER (Helen Lane, trans., 1989).
91
See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (conscientious objector
exemption granted though Welsh struck the word “religious” in his application);
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965) (test for conscientious objector
status is “whether a given belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in
the life of its possessor that is parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of
one who clearly qualifies for the exemption); Frazee v. Ill. Dept. Emp. Sec., 489 U.S.
829 (1989) (immaterial that applicant not a member of any organized religious
group).
90
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beliefs.92 Thus, sacred texts no longer seem crucial to define a religious community.
IV.

GROUPS AND THEIR SACRED STORIES

Bob’s notion of groups was anchored in Judaism, but it was
hardly limited to Jews. Moreover, he knew all too well how divided
Jews can be—and usually are.93 Bob often talked about the treatment
of the Rebellious Elder and the intricate procedural protections provided in the time of the Temple to give the rebellious man a chance to
change his mind before being strangled. I do not recall, however, any
discussion by him of the rare, and much less protective, process of formal Jewish excommunication.94 Bob struggled with—but did not get
92

For important reflections on this paradox, see Robert Burt, Robert Cover’s Passion, 17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (2005); Austin Sarat, Robert Cover on Law and
Violence, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 255. My favorite statement about this issue was in Justice Jackson’s dissent in United States v.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 94 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“Some who profess belief
in the Bible read literally what others read as allegory or metaphor, as they read Aesop's fables. Religious symbolism is even used by some with the same mental reservations one has in teaching of Santa Claus or Uncle Sam or Easter bunnies or dispassionate judges.”).
93
The rich development of Jewish law and Jewish communal life over millennia may
be attributable in part to the absence of sovereignty until the establishment of the
state of Israel in 1948. Further, the decentralizing tradition of “choose your own
rabbi” also may have aided Jewish survival. Also, the chaotic state of current Israeli
politics might suggest that Bob’s relatively benign view of groups was anchored, at
least to some extent, in the absence of state power intricately entangled with the jurisgenerative groups he celebrated.
94
STEVEN NADLER, SPINOZA, A LIFE 126 (1999) (referencing Yosef Kaplan, The
Social Functions of the Herem in the Portuguese Jewish Community of Amsterdam
in the Seventeenth Century, 1 DUTCH JEWISH HIST. 111 (1984)). The excommunication of Baruch Spinoza in Amsterdam in 1656 is by far the most famous. It seems
that members of Spinoza’s congregation had many reasons to feel insecure, and they
had to send to Italy to find out about proper excommunication procedures. See
Soifer, supra note 58, at 1044-45. All the others excommunicated in Amsterdam
around Spinoza’s time were punished, did penance, and re-entered the congregation—except Spinoza. Apparently, he simply walked away. Id. at 1045-46. A troubling, more recent example was the excommunication of Rabbi Mordecai Kaplan,
the founder of the Reconstructionist movement in Judaism, by an organization of
Orthodox Jewish congregations in July 1945. Just as World War II in Europe had
finally ended with the defeat of the Nazis, Kaplan was formally excommunicated—
and his new siddur (prayer book) burned!—in a public ceremony at one of New York
City’s largest hotels. Id.
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specific about—how to distinguish among groups, though he specifically refused to use the relatively easy out of identifying the violence
versus non-violence binary as the key.95 At times, Bob seemed to rely
on the criterion of a group being well-established, but he also hoped
and believed that groups could “invite new worlds.”96
Even to think about the vivid scenes of the January 6, 2021
insurrection and its aftermath is to grasp that a broad array of private
groups participated: Proud Boys, Oath Keepers, and many more.97
Further, it is troubling to understand that many of the participants believed they were furthering values grounded in specific sacred texts,
including the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution,
not to mention the Bible.
In other words, they seemed to be motivated by their own sacred stories. Much the same, and far worse, can be said about those
who encourage and who engage in terrorism, ethnic cleansing, and
genocide. We have witnessed a great deal of horrific evidence that
these tragic instincts are well within our human capacities—generally
perpetrated by and for groups. Bob’s dilemma remains our dilemma.
95

Soifer, supra note 54, at 63 (stressing the existing identity of groups as well as
their “stable cultural understanding”). Bob knew violence first hand. For example,
he had been badly beaten as a SNCC volunteer by his fellow prisoners in the Albany,
Georgia jail; yet he went back. The details of his experience, supplied by Bob’s
brother, Arnie, are quoted in Burt, supra note 93. In Bob’s return to Georgia in 1986,
he proclaimed himself neither a pacifist nor even an abolitionist regarding the death
penalty. The Bonds of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 3, at 831. He believed that all groups of resistance to law must come to grips with violence, but he
never got to explain how the groups he admired could be distinguished from those
who embraced “[o]utright defiance, guerilla warfare, and terrorism.” Cover, supra
note 1, at 182 (In a way, he punted with a hope for “a radical revitalization” of law
to demonstrate that violence is problematic “in much the same way whether it is
being carried out by order of a federal district judge, a mafioso, or a corporate vice
president.”).
96
Nomos and Narrative, supra note 5, at 68.
97
See, e.g., Alan Feuer, Proud Boys Leader Secretly Cooperated With F.B.I. and
Police, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27. 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/27/nyregion/proud-boys-informant-enrique-tarrio.html?smid=em-share (stating at least one
of the leaders, Enrique Torres, chairman of the Proud Boys, had extensive experience
as an FBI and police informants); Terry Gross, How a Group of Online Sleuths are
Helping the FBI Track Down Jan. 6 Rioters, NPR (Dec. 23, 2021, 1:46 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2021/12/23/1066835433/how-a-group-of-online-sleuths-arehelping-the-fbi-track-down-jan-6-rioters/ (discussing private individuals who are
currently being celebrated for voluntarily assisting the FBI by using video and other
technology to identify January 6th participants.).
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Furthermore, his focus on the role of judges underscores how far removed we now are from the “redemptive constitutionalism” he encouraged.98 Nonetheless, Bob taught that efforts towards redemption, and
not redemption itself, ought to animate us all. Bob also believed, like
Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel, that “the law must not be idolized.”99
Our relationship with law is permeable, and Bob Cover significantly advanced our understanding of the potential—as well as the
jurispathic tendencies—of the law we create. There is, after all, intrinsic frustration in the quest for justice, and judges cannot escape what
Bob called the moral versus formal dilemma as they go about their
work. Neither can the rest of us. Encumbered though we may be by
our own groups and laws, redemptive hope may help to sustain us if
we continue to seek justice—even if we recognize that justice will remain elusive. In and through law, the quest for justice is what ultimately matters.

98
99

Nomos and Narrative, supra note 5, at 66.
ABRAHAM JOSHUA HESCHEL, GOD IN SEARCH OF MAN 326 (1995).
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